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Barnett: Is Josh Harrison Who We Thought He Was?

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Earlier this week, a series of famous post-game tirades ended up in my social media feed, and I was immediately drawn to the familiar Dennis Green outburst from the 2006 Monday Night Meltdown.  If you haven’t seen it, he essentially says, “they are who we thought they are; and we let them off the hook” several times in indignant fashion.  While it may not eclipse Jim Mora’s screeching voice saying, “playoffs? Don’t talk about the playoffs. I just hope we can win a game,” it is right up there in my book

So the Mora quote might have seemed more appropriate during the Pirates six game skid last season, it was the Green quote that’s been on my mind. More precisely, the weight of it centers on the Pirates most productive hitter this far into the 2017 season, Josh Harrison.  For just when he was looking like the sub-par to mediocre offensive player we thought he was, he comes out looking like it is 2014 all over again, leaving me baffled.

Now, don’t get me wrong, Harrison’s breakout in 2014 when he posted a stellar .315/.347/.490 slash line was incredible, but I, like many of you, could never understand why the Pirates opted to extend him when they so seldom do so.  It wasn’t an absurd contract by any means, and with WAR on the open market costing around $7-9 million each of the last few seasons, he’s more than produced what he should. Yet, there were some glaring red flags when it came to Harrison that I couldn’t fathom how they got past. The .353 BABIP was one thing, but the track record offensively screamed he couldn’t possibly be bound for anything but extreme regression, which he did experience statistically, producing 7 percent fewer runs than the average player over the two subsequent seasons.

This year, however, Harrison has posted a robust .292/.355/.482 while surpassing his 2016 home run total in the first 40 days of the season, forcing me to wonder if can he keep it up or if he is simply bound to slip back into “who we thought he was.”

Luck, Injury, and Inconsistency

The two primary culprits of unexpected success or decline is generally injury and luck, so I thought it would useful to explore some of that as it relates to Harrison.

First, suppose Josh Harrison’s breakout season in 2014 was more substance than fluke; after all, he was a .308/.358/.437 in the minors who was mainly drawing a poor scouting review because of his lack of power and how it exposed him at the plate.  Also, consider that it’s not unheard of for a player to breakout as Harrison did, which John Sickels of Minor League Ball succinctly wrote in 2014, saying,  “Harrison has always made contact well. My research over the years has shown that these contact-hitting utility infield types can show “unexpected” offensive development when they get into their late 20s and are finally mature physically. I think that is what happened here.”

Perhaps, that is what happened because the stats seem to underline that notion more than luck.  In 2014, Harrison did possess the ridiculous .353 BABIP, but as Michael Barr of Fangraphs found, Harrison’s xBABIP (expected batting average on balls in play) was hanging right around there with the rest of his batting profile showing no aberrations, suggesting he may not be a candidate for significant regression.  Even though his home run/fly ball rate was higher than his career norms, it was higher in 2013 and still less than league average.

So what happened in 2015?  Let’s explore the batted ball data, searching for areas where Harrison was far off from his typical numbers or league average.

As Harrison got to June, the power evaporated, and then in July, he tore a ligament in his left thumb and proceeded to miss time from 7/5/15 to 8/20/15.  Upon returning from injury, he popped it up quite a bit in conjunction with a noticeably lower hard percent in his return before finishing out the 2015 season, in large part due to the absurdly high line drive rate, firing on all cylinders.It appears that Josh Harrison started off the 2015 season right where he left off in terms of batted ball data with the exception of the precipitous drop in BABIP.  His xBABIP won’t be quite as high, but it’s still roughly 70-80 batting average points more than his actual BABIP, signaling he was quite unfortunate despite the solid attack.  May was reasonably strong but a little more soft contact than he generally hits.

To encapsulate all of that, let’s just say that 2015 was a roller coaster ride of injury, poor luck and inconsistency.  It did, nonetheless, provide glimpses of the 2014 Josh Harrison.

Next, let’s examine the same set of numbers for 2016:

Harrison wasn’t terribly unlucky in August, but there was too much soft contact. Lastly, a groin injury cut a wacky but productive September short, giving Harrison a second straight inconsistent, unlucky and injury ride of a season. Harrison was sensational in the early going, picking up on where he left off in 2015.  The line drive rate up around 30 percent was likely unsustainable for him, yet it coincided with a low HR/FB rate and was followed by a still productive May even after the line drive rate fell back to earth. During the summer, the line drive rate cratered in absolute horrendous fortune, rending Harrison far below league average in run production.

Amidst all of that, the most disappointing thing was that 2013 and 2014 HR/FB rates of 11.5 percent and 7.4 percent respectively fell to sub 3.5 percent in successive seasons.  It’s difficult to know with any certainty the degree to which that can be attributed to poor luck or injury, but it would be naive to think it played no role at all.

Furthermore, if you take out the July  and August 2016 numbers (July because it was five days and August because it was a ten day return from injury), Harrison has posted a wRC+ of 112 or better in six out of 10 months the past two seasons, and at least one of those four months (Mar/Apr 2015) was easily the product of bad luck.  Quite frankly, that ‘s a much more positive picture than Harrison typically gets credit for.

In light of that, let’s look at Harrison’s start this season compared to 2014.

Mechanical Adjustments and Slipping

So far, the line drives are down and the power is surging at just under the league average rate, which is a remarkable feat for Harrison.  It also probably means that he’s either getting a bit lucky and/or  trying to hit in the air more, an approach being widely adapted in the Statcast era. If it’s the former, it should correct itself along with a decrease in soft contact, suggesting Harrison could still feasibly produce strong numbers since harder contact and more line drives likely means more hits even if the home run decrease brings the wRC+ down some.  Now, if it’s the latter, we could be seeing the first glimpse of a Harrison we’ve never really seen before, leaving us only with time to watch and wonder what is substance and what is luck.

Corresponding with Harrison’s breakout performance in 2014, there were several minor mechanical adjustments that he made, so if you’re suspicious of the numbers, maybe this will give you a tangible source for his success.  Ryan Parker, a former hitting guru for Baseball Prospectus, highlighted a few of them, which I’ll delineate momentarily; if however, you’d like to read a more in-depth piece on it, then see the full article here.

Essentially, there are two items that Parker highlighted that we can explore that will be illustrated in the two GIFs below:

http://gph.is/2qtCmQU

The first adjustment is concerned with how Harrison stalls his bat in 2013.  As you can see, Harrison wiggles his bat and then stalls it perpendicular to the ground, creating a bit of “hiccup” in his swing.  While it’s a minor flaw, it prevents his hands from having continuous movement in his swing by forcing them to move from a “static” position to late in the pitch to effectively keep up with major league pitching.  Now, notice in the 2014 GIF how he tilts it in a fluid, almost rearing back, that gives him more momentum with his hands as he’s swinging forward.

Secondly, watch Harrison prior to raising his foot; he sinks his backside and then raises his foot, creating another awkward movement at the plate as he prepares to launch.  Next, look how much smoother the swing looks as he takes advantage of the power generated by his launch rather than sinking and then launching.  Parker attributes this to the now direct angle his hips take in the swing rather than switching levels in the preparation and swing.

Perhaps, those are both subtle, but it’s difficult to ignore the adjustment in the wake of Harrison’s success in 2014.

Unfortunately, see what resurfaced in the summer of 2016:

To be fair, I didn’t go back and watch every at bat, but I saw enough to notice the second problem resurfacing on multiple occasions, undoubtedly contributing to the June and July struggles. The good news is that Harrison has been more consistent in his swing this season; initiating the fluid movement that is displayed in the 2014 GIF.

Batted Ball Direction

There is one additional trend that warrants our scrutiny at this time, Harrison’s batted ball direction. In the minors, Harrison displayed a knack for pulling or pushing the ball to corners and avoiding center. He wasn’t an extreme push or pull hitter by any means, but he regularly did both at an above average rate. Yet, his first three seasons in the Big Leagues experienced a trend of hitting more balls to center and pushing less to the corners, even hitting 45 percent to center field in 2013.  As you might have guessed by now, Harrison corrected that in 2014, bringing his Pull% to 45.4 percent (5 more than league average and closer to his minor numbers).

Also, there appears to be a distinct correlation throughout his minor league and major league career between wRC+ and Pull%.  All of his wRC+ performances of at least 120 occurred when he also possessed a mid 40’s or better Pull% while just one below average wRC+ occurred in that frame.

On the diagram, the 100 wRC+ is from 2015 when he pulled the ball a mere 35 percent of the time, and even if the league average run production is sufficient, it’s not what Harrison is capable of.  He responded in 2016 by pulling more; yet, he only did so at a 40 percent rate, producing a disappointing 87 wRC+.

In 2017, Harrison has fully committed to pulling the ball with a 52 percent pull rate, which is higher than he can probably keep up despite being an auspicious start to the season.  It’s commitment that should hopefully persist if Harrison wants to be successful; although a hitter can be effective with a wide array of batted ball distribution, and perhaps Harrison could be too, he’s been at his best when he’s primarily pulling the ball.

Concluding Thoughts

For the last two years, I’ve been highly critical of Harrison never expecting him to do a whole lot; yet, my wife can’t help but shout, “J-Hay All Day!” every time he makes even the slightest play even in the midst of his summer slump.  I’m not sure I can do anything but join her after the glimpse of hope the underlying numbers provide.

Obviously, I can’t say without a doubt that Harrison is going to kill it the rest of the way, but in the absence of injury and more bad luck, he’s a strong bet to be a productive player.  And more importantly, he is, at the very least, going to be more than who “who we thought he was,” which is something the Pirates’ offense desperately needs.

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