One week from today we’ll have our Black Friday Mega Announcement, giving details on the big changes coming for this site, along with some other surprises. If you missed the original announcement from the other day, be sure to check it out.
My role will be changing on this site, with more details next week. I will still be covering the Pirates, and reporting on this site. That future, plus the current changes that are going on with the Pirates’ front office, has me thinking about how to cover things this time around.
For some people, I’m known as a Neal Huntington apologist. For others, it might just be the idea that I’m a big Neal Huntington fan. Most of those people haven’t read this site in years, and formed the opinions in 2015 and earlier. I disagree with the labels, but I don’t regret anything that led to them.
When I started this site, I was really interested in how Neal Huntington would rebuild the team. I had followed the Pirates for a few years, along with other small market teams, and finally saw them building a team similar to other successful teams with similar market sizes.
That was a great thing to see. It continued when they actually focused on the draft, not shying away from Scott Boras and Pedro Alvarez. It then continued when they went with an approach to target over-slot prep players, aiming to get upside.
Finally, in 2010 and 2011, the Pirates added some core pieces that made them look like they had the chance to be a future contender, getting Jameson Taillon and Gerrit Cole in the first rounds, respectively. That gave them their first chance at a top of the rotation starter since Doug Drabek. This all came at a time when guys like Ross Ohlendorf were leading the Pirates rotation with league average numbers, and the team was so bad that this type of performance provided hope for the fans.
The plan that Neal Huntington had was a good one. The execution wasn’t as good.
Alvarez was celebrated on draft day, but in hindsight Buster Posey was the clear best choice the Pirates could have made with the second overall pick. Huntington was in a tough position here, one year after Dave Littlefield passed on Matt Wieters, who was also a Boras client, and almost an identical situation as the top college player who somehow fell to the Pirates.
The Pirates had a good strategy aiming at drafting and developing prep players, but had issues with scouting and development. The scouting improved after the 2008-2010 drafts. Most of the scouts from the early years were gone by 2011, and the Pirates saw better results from the draft going forward.
Unfortunately, the development process wasn’t working out, as we saw later with all of the top prospects like Cole, Taillon, Gregory Polanco, Josh Bell, and others who have never really come close to their upside in Pittsburgh, outside of a few brief flashes here and there.
I don’t regret believing that Neal Huntington was doing a good job. He was, and he did do a good job, up until the league started rapidly changing in 2016.
If there’s one thing I could do over, it’s the benefit of the doubt.
I thought the Pirates were eventually going to win under Huntington before most people. Even in 2012, when the team collapsed in the second half, and when a lot of people were calling for Huntington to be fired, I felt he deserved one more year, to see if the Pirates could become a winner.
My focus was on the moves they were making, and how those moves lined up with what other successful small market teams had done. I had followed Littlefield’s bungling of the roster for years, and it was refreshing to see someone with the Pirates who knew how to operate a small market team by present day standards.
There were warning signs for all of the problems above. I don’t remember a lot of good things when I saw Alvarez in High-A in 2009, and the biggest thing I remember is that he rolled over a lot of breaking pitches, grounding out to second often.
The 2009 draft was controversial with the pick of Tony Sanchez. He looked good for a few years, then started showing some flaws with his throwing and defense, which was his biggest asset coming into pro ball. The prep pitchers they took with the money they saved looked promising initially, but also struggled.
Alvarez didn’t live up to his hype, and struggled hitting for average in the process. That performance in Lynchburg in 2009 was an early warning sign, but I gave the benefit of the doubt that he was new to pro ball, and would develop. When he did better at higher levels, it looked like my thought about his High-A issues was correct.
Sanchez and the prep pitchers (which would be my band name if I had a band) didn’t really start to fall apart until around 2012-13, and I’m not sure that any of the signs were there. Sanchez just suddenly developed a horrible throwing issue, and the prep pitchers started reaching a level where they needed more results than promise, and the results didn’t come.
And yet there was always something else to counter these struggles. The 2009 prep pitchers were struggling, but guys like Tyler Glasnow, Nick Kingham, Clay Holmes, and others were performing well at the same time. Alvarez and Sanchez were struggling as first round picks, but the Pirates had Jameson Taillon and Gerrit Cole doing well.
I didn’t want to say that the Pirates had drafting or development issues based on this little bit of information. The success rate of first rounders, even in the top five, is low. Seeing the Pirates get an average-at-best MLB third baseman, and a catcher who busted in their first two drafts wasn’t hugely alarming. It definitely wasn’t enough to conclude that the Pirates couldn’t draft or develop.
But it also wasn’t enough to say that they could draft and develop.
I didn’t make any conclusive arguments to that effect. I did make my prediction that the Pirates would win, and that certain players would do well. Part of my job is making these predictions about the future. Part of it involves evaluating players based on their skills and what they could become in the future, and not so much based on the team they’re with or whether that team can get them to their upside.
My job also included reporting on everything that was happening in the system, regardless of whether it’s good or bad. I reported all of those things, but didn’t exactly play up the negatives, and the potential impact on the future for those negatives. Part of this comes with the job, and reporting on negative things in a player’s development, but also reporting on what the player is doing to fix that problem.
So what did I take away from covering the Huntington front office, and how will I approach the Cherington front office?
It’s a very similar situation on the surface. You’ve got an old GM who wasn’t up to date on the trends for small market teams. You want the new GM to do things different and be up to date on those trends. You want to see better results in certain areas that were weak, such as development, and modern pitching and hitting philosophies.
Cherington said all of the right things on those subjects. It’s encouraging to have a GM in place whose strategies are more aligned with what it takes to win in today’s MLB. But there’s no benefit of the doubt for me. Cherington will get a chance to show whether he’s doing a good job or a bad job in these areas, and I’ll be very hesitant to opine either way, but will be tracking the good and bad throughout the process.
I’d say the biggest thing I’ve learned in the last 11 years is experience. That’s not just 11 years of covering minor league baseball, talking to scouts, coaches, and so on, and getting knowledge of the game. It’s also seeing experiences. It’s seeing how players physically look at each stage, what to watch for that could be a problem later, and just trusting what I’m seeing as much as what I’m hearing from both inside and outside of the organization.
I feel that experience will be better for evaluating development trends, and specific player-focus plans. That will help determine if some of the philosophies and development techniques are really working, and what that might project going forward.
Ultimately, I feel I am in a better position for evaluating the early days of Cherington than I was at evaluating the early days of Huntington. I feel the site is in a better position as well. I’m not going to be concerned if I’m eventually called a Cherington apologist, or whatever the opposite is.
My only concern is still going to be providing accurate information and honest analysis based on that information. Then, when enough information has been collected, providing an honest view about the future of the club. That’s the same as last time. I just feel that’s going to be so much better this time around, backed by years of additional knowledge that I didn’t have before. I’m hoping to put what I learned to good use.
SONG OF THE DAY
DAILY QUIZ
There are 130 answers here. I don’t expect you to get the majority of them. Unless you’re Ethan Hullihen. Then I expect you to get at least 100.
THIS DATE IN PIRATES HISTORY
By John Dreker
Four former Pittsburgh Pirates born on this date, and the second biggest transaction in team history behind the deal that brought in Honus Wagner and company in 1899.
On this date in 1954, the Pirates selected 20-year-old outfielder Roberto Clemente in the Rule 5 draft from the Brooklyn Dodgers. It’s considered to be the best Rule 5 pick in baseball history, but at the time most of the press put emphasis on the MLB players selected. Clemente batted .255 in 124 games as a rookie in 1955.
Dick Bartell, shortstop for the 1927-30 Pirates. In four seasons in Pittsburgh, he hit .308 with 168 RBIs in 348 games. He went on to play a total of 18 years in the majors, collecting 2,165 hits and scoring 1,130 runs, while receiving MVP votes in six seasons. He also missed two years serving during WWII. Bartell had six seasons in which he was among the top four defensive players (by dWAR) in the National League.
Mike Benjamin, infielder for the 1999-2000 and 2002 Pirates. In three seasons in Pittsburgh (he was injured for all of 2001), he batted .239 in 311 games and played five different positions. He was a career .229 hitter, but his defense kept him around for 13 seasons in the majors.
John Morlan, pitcher for the 1973-74 Pirates. In seven starts and 42 relief appearances, he had a 4.16 ERA in 106 innings with the Pirates, which ended up being his entire big league career. Morlan was drafted four times before he signed, including twice in the first round by the Pirates. He played minor league ball until 1977.
Walt Tauscher, pitcher for the 1928 Pirates. In 17 appearances as a 26-year-old rookie in 1928, he had a 4.91 ERA in 29.1 innings. His only other big league experience was six relief appearances for the 1931 Washington Senators. In 23 seasons in the minors, he won 263 games.
